

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 004960

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR P (DEHART) EUR (PDAS BRADTKE), EUR/ERA
(VOLKER/BISHARAT), EUR/RPM (HOVENIER), EUR/SE
(SILLIMAN/MARCIEL)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2014

TAGS: [PREL](#) [MT](#) [TU](#) [CY](#) [EUN](#) [NATO](#) [USEU](#) [BRUSSELS](#)

SUBJECT: MALTA SEEKS US SUPPORT FOR PLAN TO RESOLVE NATO/EU
PARTICIPATION ISSUE

REF: A. BRUSSELS 4843 B. ANKARA 6402 C. VALLETTA 1048

[D](#). BRUSSELS 4082 E. NICOSIA 1974 F.
BISHARAT/BRENNER EMAIL NOVEMBER 16.

Classified By: USEU Political Military Officer Jeremy
Brenner for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

[1](#). (C) Summary. Malta's Ambassador to the EU was disappointed by the perceived lack of U.S. support for his proposal to resolve the issue of Malta's participation in NATO-EU strategic discussions. Turkish representatives to the EU have expressed a desire to see a resolution to the issue. End summary.

[2](#). (C) In discussions with Martin Xuereb, Foreign and Security Policy Attache at the Maltese Mission to the European Union, and subsequently with Malta's PermRep to the EU, we advised (per ref f) the need for the Maltese to talk directly with the NATO International Staff legal experts about their plan for resolving the issue of Malta's participation in NATO/EU strategic discussions and to stay in touch with USNATO. Xuereb told us that the decision has now been made in Valletta to pursue a course of action under which they would argue that documents signed in 1994 at the time of Malta's entry into PfP remain valid, despite their withdrawal from active participation in the program in 1996. Given the complexity of the issue, and accompanying broader political problems, we cautioned Xuereb not to expect significant movement before the end of the year.

[3](#). (C) Xuereb noted that he had already made contact with Ms. Burcu San, Deputy Director for EAPC in the NATO Secretary General's Private Office. Ms. San was reportedly unfamiliar with the Maltese plan, but offered to have the Legal Advisor and a representative from the Political section (we understand that this will be D/ASYG Robert Simmons) present at their as-yet-unscheduled meeting.

DISAPPOINTMENT WITH MESSAGE

[4](#). (C) We were called later in the afternoon by the Maltese Legal Attache, asking us to attend another meeting with Malta's EU Ambassador Cachia-Caruana. The Ambassador said he was "very unhappy" with the U.S. position, characterizing it as showing a lack of support. He fears that once the decision on Turkish accession is made, there will be little interest in resolving Malta's participation issue. He reiterated his view that a solution to Malta's NATO-EU participation issue would simplify -- not complicate -- the Turkey/Cyprus problem in the weeks before the December 17 EU decision on accession. According to Ambassador Cachia-Caruana, those who argue that a resolution to the Maltese problem would harm Turkey's EU prospects, "don't understand what's going on within the EU."

FINDING A "SPONSOR"

[5](#). (C) Ambassador Cachia-Caruana said that dealing directly with the International Staff without a "sponsor" or a show of political support could result in Malta's proposal getting bogged down or lost within the I.S. bureaucracy. He argued that if the political will were present, Malta's proposal could pass through the internal legal review very quickly. He said he has approached Javier Solana informally, and has suggested that he might go directly to NATO Secretary-General De Hoop Scheffer for support.

TURKEY ON BOARD

[6](#). (C) Cachia-Caruana also reported that the Turkish EU Ambassador had visited him on the morning of November 17 to express Ankara's support for a resolution to the Malta problem. Turkey, according to the Maltese Ambassador, was "fully available" for any solution. We spoke subsequently

with counterparts in the Turkish Mission to the EU, who confirmed that Turkey sees a resolution of the Maltese issue as a positive step. According to our contacts, Turkey sees this as a way to solidify Malta's positive vote for accession, and demonstrate flexibility and a positive will to other Member States. Similar views are reported from Ankara (ref B). The Turkish Foreign Minister will visit Malta on November 26, and we are told by Turkish EU Mission representatives that the Minister will pledge Turkish support for a resolution of the problem.

THE TIMELINE

17. (C) Ambassador Cachia-Caruana will travel to Valletta on November 25. He made clear to us that, in the absence of support for Malta's course of action, he will recommend that the idea be shelved. The Maltese Prime Minister was to have raised this issue in discussions November 18 in Valletta with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Meyers.

THE STAKES

18. (C) COMMENT: Until we can make progress on Malta/Cyprus participation, the NATO-EU dialogue will remain blocked. While we recognize that any possible solution to this impasse will likely have to await the EU's fateful December 17 decision on Turkey, there is nothing to suggest that a "yes" vote will uncork the bottle for progress on EU-NATO cooperation. The different EU and NATO decisions remain incompatible, and will still be in force. Malta is proposing a procedural bandaid that meets its own political constraints. Solving Malta's problem alone will do nothing unless a path for Cypriot participation opens as well.

McKinley